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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines two approaches to housing the urban poor in the city of Ahmedabad in the 
Indian state of Gujarat – the Slum Networking Project, an attempt to institutionalize slum 
upgrading at the city-level and the Development Plan-Town Planning Scheme mechanism, an 
enabling approach similar to land readjustment that seeks to deliver serviced land to the urban 
land market and contains a provision to reserve some of this land for housing for economically 
weaker sections of society.  
 
Given the shifts in thinking in the past three decades around housing policies in developing 
countries, and particularly in India, from project-level approaches to enabling approaches that 
attempt to tackle housing shortages and substandard quality at a broader scale, this thesis asks the 
question: What is the appropriate role of cities in adequately housing their poor populations? In 
conjunction with this, additional questions explored include: What has been the history of 
housing strategies in India? What are some relatively successful efforts that are not national-level 
policies or small community-level projects, but instead use the scale of the city to address this 
pressing issue? What are the barriers to bringing these methods to scale?  
 
This thesis finds that while upgrading approaches may provide basic services to slum dwellers at 
the project level, attempts to take upgrading to scale must carefully consider the prevalence and 
implementation capacity of NGO or other intermediaries, the demand of residents for the 
services offered, the incentives for participation by private sector entities and the pace of 
urbanization in the city in question. With respect to the Town Planning Scheme mechanism, 
there has been considerable success in converting agricultural land to serviced urban land and in 
appropriated land for housing for the urban poor, but concerns remain about the overly 
centralized nature of the process, its openness to corruption, and its neglect to consider informal 
or tenants claims on the land to be developed. Finally, it is found that the mere designation and 
availability of urban land for housing for the poor is not sufficient to instigate housing 
production and more research is needed to determine appropriate policies to encourage 
affordable housing development on this land.  
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Thesis Reader:  Yu-Hung Hong, Senior Fellow, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and 
Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Urban Studies and Planning 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
In 2007, at the end of India’s tenth five-year plan, the estimated housing shortage in the 
country was 24.7 million housing units, comprised mostly of the 21.8 million units needed for 
economically weaker sections (EWS) and 2.9 million for lower income groups (LIG),  
 the two poorest classes of Indian society (Joshi & Sanga, 2009) (Table 1, below, shows the 
income brackets represented by EWS and LIG segments of Indian society). While Indian history 
is peppered with past attempts to meet the housing needs of the country’s poor, a commonly held 
belief is that little has worked except allowing the poor to house themselves in informal 
dwellings on occupied land. As India’s urban population continues to grow and macroeconomic 
conditions improve, land and housing markets at times appear permanently closed to those 
whose incomes have not risen along with the unit costs of land and housing. At the same time, 
the 1992 74th constitutional amendment and, the Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission, a 
2005 centrally-funded urban renewal program seek to hand over more resources to Indian cities 
to meet the growing challenges of urbanization while pushing for institutional reforms and 
capacity building. 
Table 1. Income Ceiling per month per household for purposes of housing loans (2008 prices) 
Category Previous Ceiling  
before 2010 
(2006 prices in Rs.) 
Revised Limits  
March 2010 
(2008 prices in Rs.) 
EWS Up to 3300 Up to Rs. 5000 
LIG 3301 - 7300 Rs. 5001 -10000  
   
Rs. = Indian Rupees.  In 2008,1 US$ = 39.41 Rs. 
(Government of India, 2010) 
 
In the face of this persistent housing shortage for poor groups, and the nascent 
decentralization of responsibilities to urban local bodies, there is a need to understand the roles 
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that city-level actors and institutions can play in the provision of adequate shelter for urban poor 
groups. The gradual shift internationally, and particularly in India, from housing policies that are 
heavily reliant on centrally-funded housing production or international aid organization-managed 
project-based approaches to approaches which seek to enable private actors in the housing sector 
gives further weight to this need to examine the local government’s role in housing the poor. 
This research seeks to answer the question: What is the appropriate role of cities in adequately 
housing their poor populations? In conjunction with this, additional questions explored include: 
What has been the history of housing strategies in India? What are some relatively successful 
efforts that are not national-level policies or small community-level projects, but instead use the 
scale of the city to address this pressing issue? What are the barriers to bringing these methods to 
scale? This thesis examines two such efforts in the context of the city of Ahmedabad in the state 
of Gujarat: the Slum Networking Project—an attempt to bring slum upgrading to scale—and the 
Development Plan-Town Planning Scheme mechanism—an alternative to traditional land 
acquisition that seeks to bring developed land into the urban land market and set aside some 
portion of it for housing for EWS groups. 
 
Definitions 
Throughout this thesis, the term informal settlements is used to identify any unauthorized 
settlement on land not officially held by the settler, even if it has been purchased or rented on the 
informal market. This term encompasses the more narrow definition of slum, which is used here 
primarily as a reflection of the term used in the sources used to inform this document—referring 
to both notified and unnotified slums in the Indian context. The term urban poor here is used 
predominantly to refer to the housing poor, those who live in substandard housing (by local 
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definitions) such as slums, or who would join those areas upon migration to urban areas. While it 
is acknowledged that not all residents of informal settlements are necessarily income poor, it is 
those who reside in dwellings that lack adequate infrastructure or have significant public health 
concerns that the thesis concerns itself most with. 
 
Methodology 
This thesis relies primarily on secondary sources in the form of scholarly publications, industry 
reports, and organization websites. Additionally, publicly accessible Indian government 
documents from national-level ministries and from the municipal level provide key details. 
Limited personal communications with practitioners in urban planning and housing in India are 
also used.  
 
Limitations 
This research explores a broad question with respect to city-level approaches to housing the 
poor, but it is not meant to be comprehensive. Instead, it explores the question through two 
narrow case studies that generate further questions about upgrading and city-level approaches. 
While finance is acknowledged to be one of the key elements to an enabling approach (Mayo & 
Angel, 1993), this research does not address this concept except in the context of the two case 
study approaches. Broader discussions on housing finance or municipal finance are not included. 
Further, the relative success or failure of the 74th Amendment to adequately enable urban local 
bodies is not the main focus of this research, though it would greatly impact the ability of cities 
to house their poor groups. Finally, the topic of rental housing is not addressed. 
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Structure 
This thesis is divided into six sections. Chapter one is this Introduction. Chapter two gives an 
overview of the debate over strategies for housing the poor in the international development 
literature. Chapter three provides a brief history of housing development strategies and policies 
in India. Chapter four introduces the city of Ahmedabad and examines the Slum Networking 
Project. Chapter five examines the Development Plan – Town Planning Scheme mechanism. 
Chapter six concludes. 
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Chapter Two 
Housing for the Urban Poor – The Roads Taken 
 This section outlines some of the major strategies undertaken to address the challenge of 
housing the urban poor in the developing world. The purpose is to set the context for the reasons 
behind shifts in housing policies and programs that have led to the current interest in enabling 
frameworks for housing development. 
 
Slum clearance and resettlement 
Before the reality of continuing urbanization in developing countries had set in, policies 
of slum clearance dominated the sphere, with national-level governments bulldozing and 
removing informal settlements that encroached on public and private land, believing them to be 
illegal and substandard. Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1993) suggest that this primarily occurred 
during the 1950s and 1960s, though in some areas the practice continued as a dominant strategy 
well into the 1990s (Gulyani & Connors, 2002). While many governments cleared slum areas 
with little thought to where the displaced residents might go, some paired this clearance strategy 
with state-led housing production, constructing usually multifamily structures to house the 
displaced informal settlement dwellers. However, this strategy was largely believed to be too 
costly in terms of housing production costs, drew criticism from human rights activists as to the 
fairness and justice of displacement, and did not keep pace with the rapid urbanization faced by 
countries of the Global South (Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1993). Additionally, some of the sites 
chosen for construction of new multi-family housing for low-income groups were sited on the far 
reaches of the urban periphery, leading to allegations of warehousing of the poor far from the 
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amenities and resources they needed (schools, access to employment, etc) to sustain their 
livelihoods and create a better future for their families (Berner, 2002). 
 
Sites and services 
 Fueled by research by Turner (1968) and others that existing housing programs failed to 
acknowledge the incremental manner in which the poor constructed their homes, governments 
and donors turned to a pair of new strategies, sites and services and in-situ upgrading. Under 
sites and services schemes, rather than funding multifamily homes, governments, typically aided 
by international aid organizations (Cohen, 2001), sought to acquire tracts of land and outfit them 
with bare infrastructure (water and drainage, electrical hook-ups) and a basic structural frame 
(foundation, load-bearing wall, etc.) upon which the new dwellers could construct their homes. 
Typically, provision of such land included property rights for the new inhabitants (Hardoy & 
Satterthwaite, 1993).  
Proponents of this type of scheme were often influenced by the neo-liberal populist ideas 
of Peruvian scholar Hernando De Soto, who argued that given adequate property rights, the poor 
would invest on their own in their housing and surroundings (2003). While sites and services 
schemes still exist today, they too have drawn criticism in some circles. Acquisition of urban 
land for poor groups proved difficult and expensive, leading some governments and donors to 
resort to land on the urban periphery. This led to similar complaints as the public housing 
schemes, that the urban poor were being displaced from prime locations in the city and “offered” 
land in substandard locations without access to amenities. But still, these schemes were 
disconnected from a broader strategy at the city-level. Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1993) write:  
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Government sponsored site and service projects can be seen as an attempt to come to 
terms with that lack of cheap, legal housing plots, but however successful they are at the 
project level, their limitation is precisely that they are “one shot” projects. Site and 
service projects appear to tackle the problem but do so on such a small scale that they 
have little impact. They fail to tackle the real problem: an urban land market that 
excludes poorer groups. (p. 142) 
So as a city-wide strategy, sites and services showed little promise, unless land issues were 
considered in a broader sense than the project level. 
 
In-situ upgrading 
In parallel with sites-and-services, in situ upgrading came into vogue. This practice 
involved recognizing existing informal settlements and providing services, such as roads, water, 
sanitation, and electrical infrastructure in order to better the conditions of the settlements, 
especially with respect to public health concerns. In some cases, this also included new 
construction of improved housing, on the same sites as those currently occupied by informal 
communities. In situ upgrading had some benefits over sites and services in that it did not seek to 
relocate the slum dwellers, and recognized the link between settlement location and livelihood. 
Furthermore, it did not require the lengthy process of identifying adequate urban land for 
housing, opting instead to target the land already occupied by informal settlements.  
While in situ upgrading appears to be a single strategy, it in fact took on many forms in 
different locales. Most common were community-level projects involving a small number of 
households linked to community-based organizations such as savings groups (Mitlin, 2007) or to 
non-government organizations. These projects typically involved some sort of assistance or 
   
 14 
subsidy, paired with a self-help component that required that residents provide some of the labor 
for the construction. Low-cost building materials or construction methods were also typical. 
Other attempts, sometimes termed redevelopment, involved the construction of new housing on 
the land of the existing slum communities, sometimes returning the entire land area back to the 
former residents, but more often, implementing a type of land sharing scheme that allowed the 
land owners or private developers to use a portion of the land for their own purpose, in exchange 
for granting tenure or constructing the housing.1 
 As in-situ upgrading grew in popularity, debate raged over the provision of property 
rights. Some argued that residents must first be given official titles and rights to the lands they 
built their homes upon, before any upgrading could take place. Others (Gulyani & Connors, 
2002) pointed out that in some cases, upgrading could move forward with the granting of tenure 
(even short term) instead of titles.  
 Many upgrading projects employed the use of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
or community-based organizations (CBOs) as intermediaries between financing organizations 
and the urban poor (Satterthwaite, 2010). Following the tenets of decentralization, it was thought 
that those NGOs and CBOs that worked directly with the poor would best be able to respond to 
                                                           
1 Mukhija (2001) uses Mumbai as a case study to suggest that the effectiveness of “self-help” upgrading is subject to 
certain assumed physical conditions: 
1. Low-income housing settlements are in peripheral locations 
2. The settlements have a very mixed land use 
3. The settlements are clearly and regularly laid out 
4. Individual lot-sizes within these settlements are “reasonably” large  
 
Countering prevailing wisdom that the solution to informal settlements in cities lay solely in slum upgrading and 
tenure legalization, Mukhija shows that in the case of Mumbai, more centrally-located, residentially-dominated slum 
areas, with irregular, often small lots, led some residents of informal settlements to view demolition and 
redevelopment as a more desirable alternative to upgrading. Residents of Rajendra Prasad Nagar Dharavi, an 
informal settlement in Mumbai, occupied land of high value in a prime location and primarily worked away from the 
settlement. Furthermore, the settlement pattern was irregular, making provision of infrastructure difficult and lots 
sizes were small, making the possibility of a formal unit in a multi-family structure with a minimum of 180ft2, quite 
attractive. Finally, slum dwellers saw redevelopment as a chance for not just an improvement in their housing 
condition, but also in the value of their property. 
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their needs. This also followed popular declarations of the effectiveness of participatory 
decision-making and grassroots organizing as methods of addressing the concerns of and 
building capacity among poor communities (Berner & Phillips, 2005). 
 Upgrading was considered by some as a great success, particularly in its careful 
consideration of the participation by the urban poor. Some practitioners who worked with poor 
groups felt that such schemes were empowering, giving control over decision-making about their 
environment to poor groups, and building their capacity for collective action and project 
development (Satterthwaite, 2010). Furthermore, it reaffirmed the “right to the city” of poor 
groups, acknowledging their demand for spaces and locales that gave them access to a 
productive livelihood, rather then relocating them to far-flung areas of the city. Cohen, Madavo 
& Dunkerly (1983), in a review of the first ten years of World Bank urban programs, write: 
upgrading existing settlements should have equal priority with developing new sites and 
services, in part because of the advantages in physical access to employment that 
settlements provided to the poor. Access was considered an important link between 
shelter, employment, and services, and thus a key factor in the efficiency of the city.  
(p. 5) 
Others championed the upgrading approach because of its cost-effectiveness and 
opportunity for cost recovery when compared to a direct provision of housing. For example, the 
World Bank-financed Kampung Improvement Project in Indonesia, widely-cited as an urban 
services improvement success, achieved per capita costs of $37 (Cohen, 2001). Part of the 
success of upgrading approaches in general was a relaxing of standards of quality of construction 
and outputs in the upgrading process. Rather than setting building codes and material 
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specifications to the highest level, an intermediate level was found that could both meet cost 
constraints and still adhere to basic safety standards (Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1993).  
 Still, as a strategy for cities, the project-by-project approach of early upgrading efforts 
was considered by some time consuming and inefficient. In his review of 30 years of urban 
lending by the World Bank, Cohen (2001) summarizes the findings of a 1983 World Bank study: 
• If the projects enjoyed physical success, they were nevertheless facing numerous time-
consuming obstacles and institutional problems such as land acquisition, tendering and 
awarding of construction contracts, inadequate cost recovery and inadequate coordination 
among public sector agencies.  
• Although the first-generation projects were estimated to have helped 11 million urban 
poor – a considerable number – this was vastly inadequate to the scale of the needs of the 
growing numbers of urban poor.  
• To address the last two problems above, much more attention had to be devoted to the 
policy and institutional contexts of projects. Individual neighborhood projects needed to 
be more closely linked to the policies and routine functions of municipal governments 
such as operations and maintenance of urban infrastructure and tax collection. (p. 44) 
 
Urban management 
 This evaluation of project-based investments led to the creation and support of an “urban 
management approach” to housing and infrastructure. Cohen (2001) writes: “Rather than devote 
detailed attention to urban projects at the neighborhood level, it was necessary to support 
processes which generated the necessary capacity to produce many more houses and urban 
infrastructure networks.” (p. 44) This approach would take the form of “urban management, 
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[which] in developing countries should seek to achieve the simple but fundamental twin 
objective of:  
• planning for, providing and maintaining a city’s infrastructure and services, and  
• making sure that the city’s local government is in a fit state, organizationally and 
financially, to ensure that provision and maintenance." (McGill, 1998, p. 469) 
Jones and Ward (1994) provide the World Bank’s key elements to the New Urban Management 
Program: 
[T]he Bank places “paramount importance” on reducing the constraints to urban 
productivity. In a recent Bank assessment, four constraints on urban productivity were 
identified. The first is the deficiency in infrastructure. Here, the Bank advocates that 
governments must strengthen the management of urban infrastructure and reinforce their 
institutional capacities to operate and maintain this system. The second constraint is the 
regulatory framework which the Bank urges governments to overhaul in order to increase 
market efficiency and to enhance the role of the private sector in shelter and infrastructure 
provision. The third constraint on productivity is the financial incapacity of municipal 
institutions, which, therefore, require a more effective division of resources and 
responsibility between central and local government. Fourth, the Bank identifies the weak 
financial system, which requires strengthening and deregulating. (p. 39) 
In sum, the urban management strategy sought to scale up from project-based approaches to 
municipality or metropolitan level approaches that could provide a framework to managed and 
ease the implementation of projects. The New Urban Management Program was a joint effort by 
the World Bank, UNDP, and UNCHS in testing this new approach, though some would later 
claim that to conflate the actions and strategies taken by the Bank with those of the UN is a 
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mistake as the Bank employed a much more strictly neoliberal approach while the UNCHS 
included community groups and NGOs as potential partners (Keivani & Werna, 2001).  
 In the field of housing, urban management gave rise to the paradigm of “enabling” 
approaches to housing development. Again a term with a broad scope, enabling was interpreted 
by some as support in the form of deregulation of land markets to ease the way for private 
developers to acquire land for housing production. Another interpretation was the strengthening 
of municipal finance systems so that local governments could better allocate funds toward 
housing, rather than rely on center-local transfers or foreign assistance. Institution-building was 
also a component, in some cases a new authority was created to deal specifically with urban 
development issues, including housing strategies (Mayo & Angel, 1993). Another group of 
actors took a different approach to the term “enabling.” For the United Nations Human 
Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), enabling strategies also included building systems of 
housing finance for individuals, including the urban poor, increasing method of participation by 
the poor in urban decision making and self-help strategies (United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme, 2006).  
 Support and criticism for enabling varied based on the type of approach. The defined 
program of the World Bank in urban management drew quick fire for its neo-liberal slant. As the 
program grew, critics also pointed to the fact that the “direct link between its policies and 
poverty groups has tended to become steadily “fuzzier” (Jones and Ward 1994, p. 36). In other 
words, while purportedly attempting to improve urban management so that municipalities could 
better shoulder the responsibility of assisting the urban poor, that target demographic was 
increasingly forgotten in the attention to municipal institutions, finance, etc. Municipalities 
following Bank models were accused of catering too much to the private sector and forgetting 
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the needs of everyday urban citizens (2002). 
 Self-help, too, had its detractors. Some argued that the NGOs and CBOs assisting poor 
communities were given too much credit and adulation with respect to their efficiency, freedom 
from political influence, or capacity to deliver quality services. Some NGOs were even cited as 
not adequately listening to or respecting the needs of poor communities, upending the main 
reasons cited for their success (Sivam & Karuppannan, 2002). Others found the whole process of 
self-help time-consuming and too complex as in many cases communities first needed to be 
organized, educated, and their capacity for project development built before a physical project 
could even commence. Attempts to quickly scale up self-help projects, even when a municipal 
framework was developed, at times led to skipping these crucial steps and negative project 
outcomes (Das & Takahashi, 2009). 
 
Where to? 
 While slum clearance has clearly lost prominence as a major component of housing policy, 
in many cities seeking a “world class city” image, the practice remains de facto, if not de jure. 
State-led housing provision failed to keep pace with housing needs of the poor, but centrally-
funded housing production schemes also still exist in many areas, particularly where markets 
continue to fail to provide housing at a price which is affordable for low-income populations. 
The difficulties of acquiring cheap, adequately-located land for sites and services schemes have 
led to the downfall of that practice, but its partner strategy—in situ upgrading—retains a devoted 
following due to its reputation as a cost-effective and participatory practice that sees informal 
settlements as solutions, rather than problems. But the project-by-project nature of upgrading led 
to criticisms that it could only achieve success at the neighborhood level, with cases of upgrading 
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taken to scale few and far between. Some of these critics note that governments and aid agencies 
would better serve the urban poor by enabling private actors to develop housing. Approaching 
the housing sector as a market to support, through finance and land regulations, infrastructure 
provision and institutional capacity building offered an opportunity to tackle the housing 
problem at a higher level, in a more sustainable way. 
 This thesis examines two case studies, which represent aspects of taking upgrading to 
scale, and enabling housing through infrastructure provision and land regulations, respectively, 
in the Indian city of Ahmedabad. Particular attention is paid to the Development Plan - Town 
Planning Scheme mechanism because while it has recently attracted much attention, there is less 
critical research on it than the Slum Networking Project. The next section offers a brief history of 
housing policies and strategies in India, to provide a base for the exploration in the case studies.  
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Chapter Three 
The Indian Context and a Brief History of Indian Housing Policy 
The Indian context 
With an estimated 1.16 billion citizens in July 2009, India is second only to China in 
population, making it the largest democracy in the world. As of the 2001 Indian census, 35 cities 
within its borders had populations of over 1 million. While its economy ranks the world’s fifth 
largest, given its large population, the per capita GDP is much lower, falling in the lower half of 
the world’s nations (The World Factbook, 2009). A recent World Bank study estimating world 
poverty finds that 24.3 percent of Indians live on less than $1.00 per day2, 41.6 percent on less 
than $1.25 and 75.6 percent on less than $2.00 a day (Chen & Ravallion, 2008).  
With this overwhelming population, and particularly the high concentration of poor 
groups, it is perhaps unsurprising that the housing shortage mentioned earlier in this paper is so 
persistent. Other factors have contributed to the situation, including a high concentration of land 
ownership among elites, despite past measures3 taken to curb this phenomenon (Acharya, 1987). 
The details of land ownership in India, however, are not clear in many cases. In most areas, there 
are considerable overlapping claims to land, both formal and informal. Patel, et al. (2009), 
through a study of urban land management in Gujarat, reveal that multiple city level agencies 
hold separate databases of land ownership with varying levels of depth, statutory backing, and 
                                                           
2 The study uses a measure of purchasing power parity (PPP) to estimate the $1.00 amount in each country. 
3 The 1976 Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act was meant to limit the amount of urban land held by any given 
individual. As the preamble states:  
An Act to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the 
acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such 
lands and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the 
hands of few persons and speculation and profitability therein and with a view to bringing about an 
equitable distribution of land in urban agglomeration to subserve the common good. (as cited in Acharya, 
1987, p. 40) 
The repeal of the Act in 1999 is discussed later in this document. 
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accuracy. This is not even including the claims to land made by occupiers of public and private 
lands who may have paid for their tenancy through informal markets.  
These factors—sizeable poor population, democratic governance, and inequitable and 
unclear land ownership—are important contextual issues to take into account when evaluating 
housing policies for Indian cities. What follows is a brief history of past Indian housing policies, 
at varying levels of government—city, state and national. 
 
Overview of Indian housing policies 
Understanding that as a result of the 74th Amendment to the Constitution of India, and the 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, municipal governments are being tasked 
with increasing responsibility with respect to services for the urban poor, this section provides a 
brief history of Indian housing policy, leading to the reforms that reduced the role of the central 
government in direct housing provision and increased the roles of local government, the private 
sector and community groups.  
 Government involvement in housing in India began in the colonial period, when public 
health concerns in Indian cities led to the creation of Improvement Trusts: 
The Bombay City Improvement Trust…was the first such colonial body to be created, in 
1898, as a direct response to the outbreak of plague. It was empowered to control 
development, make new streets, open out crowded localities, reclaim and drain land, and 
construct dwellings.... Its autocratic powers to acquire and demolish any property simply 
by serving a notice, without compensation, were understandably resented by both 
landlords and tenants. Those displaced by slum clearance often chose not to move into 
the Improvement Trust chawls, but stayed around the demolished area in even more 
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congested conditions…. By 1920 the Trust had demolished 24,428 dwellings, but built 
only 21,837 to replace them, so that after considerable effort and expenditure, it was 
adding to the quantitative housing shortage rather than alleviating it, and was forced to 
resort to “slum patching.” Such was its unpopularity for its demolition work, and lack of 
compensation to slum landlords, that in 1917 there was agitation (which the colonial 
officials resisted) to transfer it to the municipality. (Home, 1997, p. 171) 
 Town planning laws emerged in the early 1900s, with Bombay again on the forefront, 
passing the Bombay Town Planning Act in 1915. The Act sought to mend some of the unpopular 
elements of the Improvement Trusts’ methods by introducing a “betterment approach, which 
distributed the cost of development schemes over the land improved, with a fair profit to the 
owners and a tax on betterment” (Home, 1997, p. 175). In other words, landlords were taxed for 
the costs of the new roads and other infrastructure provided, but were also able to benefit from 
the improved value to the land. For the city’s benefit, the Act sought to bring developed land to 
the market that would otherwise have remained agricultural.  
 After India gained independence from Britain, in 1947, the newly developed Planning 
Commission of India was tasked with creating strategy documents for the country’s 
development, in the form of Five Year Plans with budget allocations for various sectors and 
initiatives (Rao, 2006). Attention to the housing sector in the first few Plans took the form of 
direct provision of housing by the central government. As the First Five Year Plan (1951-1956) 
noted, “it is not possible for private enterprise by itself to meet the housing needs of the lower 
income groups. The economic rent for even the minimum standard of accommodation is 
altogether beyond the means of the working class and a large section of the middle classes” (as 
cited in Sivam & Karuppannan, 2002, p. 71). The Indian central government thus began a series 
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of programs aimed at providing housing for those who could not gain access to it through market 
mechanisms. Sivam & Karuppannam (2002) provide a good overview of housing policies and 
programs in India, included here in Table 2. 
Table 2. State policies for provision of housing for low-income groups--the Indian perspecitve 
 
 
 
Source: (Sivam & Karuppannan, 2002) 
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 During the Second Five Year Plan (1956-1961), the Indian government also began a 
program of slum clearance and rehabilitation of housing. However, this effort quickly failed as 
acquisition of slum or other nearby land proved difficult and residents of slum areas, naturally, 
resisted relocation away from their places of employment. Furthermore, the number of dwellings 
destroyed outnumbered those constructed, leading to a net loss in housing stock (Sivam & 
Karuppannan, 2002). As Rao (2006) notes, the majority of the pre-reform government-sponsored 
housing programs were in the early decades after Independence, but a few other programs came 
about in the 70s and early 80s—in 1972, the “Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums” 
program attempted to use self-help principles to upgrade urban slums and in 1980, the “Sites and 
Services Schemes” sought to provide EWS groups with serviced land on which to construct their 
own housing (Rao, 2006; Sivam & Karuppannan, 2002). The Fifth Plan (1975-1980) also 
introduced the idea of cross-subsidization, including high-income and middle-income groups in 
the target populations for government housing.  
 Many scholars (Mahadeva, 2006; Rao, 2006; Sivam & Karuppannan, 2002) seem to 
agree that the pre-1990 programs failed to adequately provide housing to the Indian population, 
particularly to EWS and LIG segments of society. While some housing was created, a few slums 
upgraded, and some land allocated to poor groups, the solutions failed to match the scale of the 
problem and targeted beneficiaries were often not the actual recipients of government housing 
assistance. Rao (2006) points to a number of additional factors that also explained the country’s 
poor performance in housing, including the 1976 Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act which 
was intended to restrict landowners from accumulating large amounts of urban land, the 
persistence of Rent Control Acts in many states which reduced incentives for rental housing 
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production and maintenance, and difficult tax and fee structures that inhibited the private land 
and housing markets.  
 Beginning in early 1990s, there was a significant shift in the direction of national housing 
policies and programs. In line with the broader trend of macro-economic liberalization, the role 
of the government in the housing sector was redefined. Instead of direct provision of housing or 
serviced sites, the emphasis was on “enabling” the private and cooperative housing sectors. 
Beginning with the Eight Five Year Plan (1992-1997) and the National Housing and Habitat 
Policies of 1994 and 1998, importance was placed on providing a policy framework with 
legislative, fiscal and financial systems to give structure to this facilitating role for the 
government (Rao, 2006; Sivam & Karuppannan, 2002). This meant the organizing of a housing 
finance sector, suggesting amendments to rent control legislation, emphasizing the provision of 
infrastructure, and repealing the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act4 at the national level. 
                                                           
4 A 1998 article in Frontline magazine, before the repeal act passed, reports that the repeal efforts were led by then 
Urban Affairs minister and member of the BJP, Ram Jethmalani. At the time of the article’s writing, the repeal 
seemed unlikely to succeed, with a large number of non-BJP members aligned against the bill in the form proposed. 
 
The argument at the time was that the ULCRA had failed to meet its stated goal – “to prevent speculation and 
profiteering and to ensure equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good” and 
thus “restricted the housing supply for the poor and the middle class” (Mahalingam, 1998). While the Act was meant 
to be used by the State to identify and acquire urban land held by single landholders that was in excess of pre-
prescribed limits (500 square meters for Delhi and Mumbai, etc), in practice, very little land was acquired. Sections 
20 and 21 of the bill empowered State governments to grant discretionary exemptions to landholders for reasons 
such as location or if the land as already set to be used for housing for LIG or EWS persons (Acharya, 1987). 
Unfortunately, the prospect of exemptions led many landowners with “excess” land to apply for them and State 
governments granted exemptions for far more acres of urban land than they acquired (Mahalingam, 1998), leading 
many to claim that the ULCRA was ultimately unsuccessful. Furthermore, the reduced ability to purchase large 
tracts of land may have actually reduced the amount of land on the market, causing prices to rise and reducing 
availability for the urban poor and middle classes.  
 
While it can be argued that it was the implementation of the legislation, not the Act itself that was flawed (Kabra, 
cited in Mahalingam, 1998), the fact of the matter remained that the ULCRA failed to achieve its stated goal and in 
1999, the government of India repealed the national level law, with many states subsequently repealing their local 
versions. As a result, land previously tied up in litigation between landowners and state governments was released to 
the landowners. While later studies illuminated the amount of land that was returned to the market after states 
repealed their versions of the land ceiling act (Government of India, 2005), less was written about the actual impact 
on land prices or housing for the urban poor. In fact, some critics have suggested that the repeal led to increased land 
speculation and thus higher prices, further barring low income groups from access to land markets (Mahadevia & 
Bhatt, 2002) 
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Part of the emphasis on enabling the housing sector was its high employment potential as well as 
economic linkages backward and forward in the economy (Mahadeva, 2006). The reforms fell in 
line with the shift in international debate around housing issues in organizations like the World 
Bank and United Nations Centre for Human Settlements.  
 While the reforms were lauded by some for their gains for the housing sector as a whole, 
there is less evidence as to the effect of the reforms on EWS and LIG segments of society. Rao 
(2006) cites improved access to home loans for the middle class, availability of large areas of 
land for private housing developers, and public-private partnerships for housing delivery in some 
cities as key successes of the reforms. The result has been greater affordability of home-
ownership for the middle class due to increased housing stock and competitive interest rates. 
Mahadeva (2006), on the other hand finds that while housing stock and the quality of available 
housing did increase, so did the population, especially in urban areas, leading to a significant 
increase in overcrowding in existing dwellings. While not a lot of detailed information is 
available, it also appears that in some cities, a portion of the new housing stock, in the form of 
high-rise apartments, lay vacant due to speculation.  
 On the whole, there exists a significant gap in the literature analyzing the effects of the 
repeal of ULCRA or revisions in rent control legislation. While both of these actions are 
requirements for receiving funding under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission 
(JNNURM)5, which began in 2005, some Indian states undertook them earlier than others and 
the distinct effect on housing and land markets in those areas should be closely examined. 
                                                           
 
5 In 2007, the state of Maharashtra received a stern warning from the GoI, mandating the repeal and threatening the 
loss of JNNURM funding beginning the following March. While the repeal had the support of both the ruling 
Congress-NCP coalition and the major opposition party, the BJP, lack of political will to actually raise the issue had 
left the repeal bill tabled for the previous two sessions of Congress (“Maharashtra assures repeal of ULCA Bill,” 
2007). 
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Persistent land and housing speculation could erase the positive effects of the repeal and 
revisions, but some cities and states may have found better ways than others to deal with these 
issues. This is a clear area for more investigation. 
 The reforms to national level housing policies also coincided with the passing of the 74th 
Amendment to the Constitution of India which decentralized certain powers and responsibilities, 
including urban planning, infrastructure development6, and slum improvement, to urban local 
bodies (ULBs) (Mahadeva, 2006). It has taken some years for the reforms to really take effect, 
and appropriate municipal financing mechanisms are just beginning to take hold. In 1998, the 
city of Ahmedabad was the first to issue municipal bonds without a state-level guarantee, 
showing progress toward improved municipal finance. Many cities, too, have reformed or newly 
instituted property tax mechanisms, another requirement of the JNNURM program. It is hoped 
that this tax, combined with user charges, will help cities fund more of their own programs and 
operations.    
 The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission marks a significant step by the 
central government to incentivize local reforms and actions. This includes mandatory reforms at 
the municipal level to guarantee municipal funding for services to the urban poor and the 
provision of those services, including security of tenure at affordable prices, improved housing, 
water supply and sanitation. But if municipal finance is just getting on its feet, and cities have 
not, in the past, been tasked with the complete responsibility for these services, will the reforms 
work? A cursory review of a few of the City Development Plans for the Basic Services to the 
Urban Poor program within JNNURM reveals common challenges: 
                                                           
6 While in the past some municipal level governments undertook urban planning efforts, much of the financing and 
other assistance for infrastructure development and slum improvement came from the central government (A. 
Kundu, Bagchi, & D. Kundu, 1999). Mehta and Mehta (1989)suggest that prior to 1988, little attention was paid to 
urban and regional planning at any level of government and institution reforms were needed to make the best of 
rapid urbanization in the country. 
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• a lack of financial resources at the municipal level 
• lack of information about urban slums 
• uncertainty about available land for housing for the poor 
• a lack of coordination between agencies involved in housing, infrastructure, planning 
and finance 
• a lack of connection between infrastructure in the slum areas and the rest of the city 
• slow progress historically toward meeting housing or infrastructure goals 
• uncertainty about the results of public-private partnerships for housing or infrastructure 
• limited private sector participation in slum areas 
• rapid city growth that increases the scale of the issues to the metropolitan level 
(Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority, & 
CEPT University, Ahmedabad, 2006; Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, 2006; Kochi 
Municipal Corporation, 2006; Surat Municipal Corporation, Surat Urban Development 
Authority, & School of Planning, CEPT University, Ahemedabad, 2006) 
However, some cities have had more success and experience than others with attempts to find 
solutions to these challenges. The following chapters look at one program and one piece of 
legislation in the city of Ahmedabad in the Indian state of Gujarat, that have tried to make 
progress toward the goal of adequate housing for the urban poor. 
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Chapter Four 
Understanding the Challenges of “Enabling” Upgrading: The Slum Networking Project 
The Ahmedabad Context: Population 
 Located in the western state of Gujarat, the 
city of Ahmedabad is the largest city in that state, 
the seventh largest city in India, and rapidly 
growing, housing 23.25 % of Gujarat’s urban 
population in 1991, and rising to 25% in 2001. 
The urban agglomeration (UA) population of 
Ahmedabad increased from 3.31 million in 1991 
to around 4.5 million in 2001. The population in 
the AMC limits increased to 3.5 million in 2001 
from 2.8 million in 1991.  
 
Housing and the Urban Poor 
 The 2006-2012 City Development Plan 
(CDP) for Ahmedabad prepared for the 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) suggests that while the state of 
Gujarat has been fairly effective in reducing poverty, with the percentage of the population living 
below the poverty line (Rs. 24,180 per year in 2001) dropping from 33.3 percent in 1983 to 14.1 
percent in 1999-2000, housing conditions in the city of Ahmedabad are still poor—32.4 percent 
of the city’s population lives in slums and 66 percent of those are below the poverty line.  The 
Source: Kleinenhammans 2009 
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average yearly income of slum dwellers in 2001 was Rs. 25,752, just below the poverty line and 
well within the EWS income bracket. 
 The Ahmedabad CDP also states that while the number of slums in the city has not 
increased significantly, the population in the slums almost doubled between 1991 and 20017. The 
2001 figure is estimated to be 884,000 people, out of a city population of roughly 3.5 million.  
This number does not include the approximately 1 million people living in the chawls, tenements 
in the city once built by mills and factories to house their workers, which also lack some basic 
amenities.  
 
The Slum Networking Project background 
Heralded by many (Government of Dubai, 2006; Dutta, 2000; SAATH, 2010; Parikh, 
2008) as a cost-effective program showcasing the potential for partnership between the local 
government (AMC), industry, NGOs, and slum dwellers themselves, the Slum Networking 
Project (SNP) in Ahmedabad is an example of an initiative that sought to take slum upgrading to 
scale. Structured to improve upon a previous effort in Indore (A. Kundu, 2001), the SNP sought 
to bring water and sanitation infrastructure to selected informal communities. As the Ahmedabad 
Municipal Corporation (AMC) described: 
The slums so far were being treated as [a] separate entity devoid of linkages with the city 
level services. Infrastructure in the slums is inadequate. Without creating additional 
infrastructural facilities, it is not possible to establish links of slums pockets with the 
mainstream services. It [was] therefore decided to improve the infrastructure around the 
slum and establish linkages of all services at an average cost of Rs. 3000/ per dwelling unit. 
                                                           
7 There is some discrepancy in the data presented in the Ahemedabad CDP, with one count of the number of slums 
in the city in 2001 totaling 710 and another totaling 1023. Either count represents a decrease from 1991 figure of 
1029. 
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(2008) 
While official title to occupied land was not provided, the AMC did agree to extend ten years 
secure tenure to dwellers that took part in the Slum Networking Project8. 
 A key element of the cost-effectiveness of the original project was for slum dwellers to 
provide funding for a third of the cost of each dwelling unit. In the original pilot project (1996-7) 
at Sanjaynagar, a local textile firm, Arvind Mills, acting through SHARDA Trust, an entity it 
created specifically for the Project, and the NGO (SEWA-related Mahila Housing Trust or 
SAATH) involved would each provide the additional third of the project costs. NGOs with 
strong networks and histories of working in slum communities were recruited to conduct 
community mobilization and development activities and private engineering firms were used for 
the design of the infrastructure layouts. While this harmonious story is the one often cited in the 
bids for Best Practice Awards (Government of Dubai, 2006; Parikh, 2008), most academic 
articles (Davis, 2004; Samad, 2006) are quick to point out that Arvind Mills/SHARDA Trust 
pulled out of the initiative after the pilot phase, citing institutional disagreements and a heavy 
financial burden (Chauhan & Lal, 1999). The AMC took over the private industry share of the 
                                                           
8 News coverage of the plight of slum dwellers suggest that in some cases, this does not hold true. Informal 
settlements continue to be cleared for development projects, such as the highly publicized Sabarmati Riverfront 
Project, and some of the relocation sites, such as Piplag, lie on the outskirts of the city with minimal access to 
schools or employment (Nayudu, 2008). 
 
Sites for clearance even included areas included in the Slum Networking Project in the past, which were evicted 
within the 10 year secure tenure time span. Some allege that even at the temporary rehabilitation site in Piplag, they 
are being asked to shell out funds for SNP while awaiting homes under the JNNURM scheme (Nayudu, 2009a, 
2009b). A September 2009 article on Indian Express.com suggests a level of unpredictability around the Town 
Planning Schemes: 
Claiming that the AMC cannot be sure of its town planning scheme even for the next five years, Anand 
Patel, Additional City Engineer, who is heading SNP, said: “The town planning schemes and infrastructure 
projects are conceptualised on a routine basis. After placing the slums under SNP, we cannot remove them 
from that spot until 10 years, but if a major project has to be developed, we give them alternative 
rehabilitation, which is a big commitment.” (Nayudu, 2009a)  
 
An October article quoted Patel again: “The slums should enjoy till they are under SNP and AMC decides on their 
resettlement. Application or removal of SNP is our choice. Moreover, SNP is more of a mental load for us, so we are 
also thinking of shortening the stay period of SNP from 10 years to 2-3 years.” (Nayudu, 2009b) 
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costs for each dwelling in most cases, except for a few instances where the Lions Club or 
Confederation of Indian Industry, private sector-related charitable organizations, offered a 
contribution (Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2008). 
 
Successes of the Slum Networking Project in Ahmedabad 
Between 1996 and 2005, the SNP upgraded around 8,400 dwellings in 45 slum 
communities, serving an estimated 39,000 people. Some see it as a successful approach in that it 
recognizes and builds on the efforts of the urban poor to construct their own environment in the 
face of barrier to entry in the formal housing market. It sees slum communities not as structures 
to be erased off of or moved on a map, but as conscious decisions to chose an optimal locale for 
housing and contribute resources, albeit often on the informal market, to its development. Some 
have also considered the SNP a participatory project, though critics (Davis, 2004; Samad, 2006) 
show that in fact, one of the limits to the spread of the SNP was the limited choice that slum 
dwellers had in the package of services provided, indicating that the residents had little influence 
over project design. 
One often overlooked success of the SNP was that the project awakened some of the 
partners involved to the potential for partnerships to provide services to the urban poor, giving 
rise to an additional Slum Electrification Programme (Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 
2008). The program was a partnership between Mahila Housing SEWA Trust, SAATH, AMC, 
USAID and the Ahmedabad Electric Company (AEC), a private utility company. In the pilot 
phase, slums that had participated in the Slum Networking Project were targeted for 
electrification, following a “Willingness to pay” study funded by USAID. In this partnership, the 
AEC provided the technical aspects, the NGOs and CBOs connected to the slum dwellers and 
   
 34 
provided financing (SEWA Bank), and the AMC provided the regulatory framework, permission 
for “road opening,” and “No-Objection Certificates” which “effectively ceded tenure to the slum 
dwellers” (Smyser, 2004, p. 26).  USAID subsidized the initial household connections in the 
pilot project, but the project continued after their departure, with a 2008 AMC document 
reporting that 99,931 households in 350 slums had been covered by the Slum Electrification 
Project thus far (Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2008). This follow-up project actually 
achieved greater success than the Slum Networking Project itself, covering around ten percent of 
the slum dwellers in Ahmedabad, while SNP only covered about one percent (Satyanand, 2007). 
While the initial AEC tenure requirements related to the tenure granted under the SNP scheme, 
later amendments allowed non-SNP communities to participate: 
The AEC “delinked tenure of land with availing electricity connection and substituted it 
with an indemnity bond which requires slum dwellers to sign an agreement stating that 
they would not pursue any legal proceeding with AEC if they were evicted or relocated 
from their homes in future” (Mahila Housing SEWA Trust, 2009) 
 
Critiques of the Slum Networking Project 
 The lack of participation mentioned earlier was not the only critique of the SNP. Chauhan 
and Lal (1999), SHARDA Trust officers, give reasons for the withdrawal of Arvind Mills and 
SHARDA Trust from the venture, claiming a mismatch of approach between the AMC and 
SHARDA. They suggest that the Municipal Corporation was not able to relinquish control of key 
aspects of the project to the private corporation and acted in an unhelpful manner. The authors 
claim this to be the main reason with financial concerns being secondary. Hesselberg (2002), on 
the other hand, suggests that the lack of incentive for continued support of such a project, due to 
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Arvind Mills receding from the global market, paired with financial concerns, may offer a more 
valid explanation. With no incentive for involvement beyond what the Chauhan and Lal (1999) 
term “enlightened self interest,” or a desire to push Ahmedabad to become a “Global city,” the 
financial outlays required for involvement in the project amounted to philanthropy, with little 
return. As the project scaled up, the cost to the company would only increase. The withdrawal of 
Arvind Mills meant that other partners needed to replace them in their roles at technical 
assistance providers and funders for the project. These burdens fell on the NGOs and AMC, with 
Mahila Housing SEWA Trust and SAATH taking on increasing roles in project implementation 
and the AMC contributing additional funds (Das & Takahashi, 2009).  
 Outside of the partnership issues, Das and Takahashi (2009) point out that the project 
required significant capacity building for the NGOs involved. As community mobilization-
driven organizations, it took significant time and energy to build the capacity for technical 
assistance needed for the project. Additionally, some NGO workers complained that other 
partners in the project did not appreciate the community mobilization and development process 
and did not allow adequate time and resources to complete these aspects well. Das and Takahashi 
explain that at the time of writing, only the two NGOs originally involved in the project have 
become a part of it. Without expanding their geographic influence, or encouraging other NGOs 
to join, the SNP is doomed to continue at a pace that will not begin to meet the needs of the 
rapidly urbanizing city. According to their website (SAATH, 2010), SAATH has since ceased 
involvement in the SNP. Samad (2006) additionally attributes some of the failure to scale up to 
parallel systems for service delivery, which had considerable political backing. 
 The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation echoes some of the concerns listed above in their 
2006 City Development Plan, stating: 
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• Slow pace of slum upgradation: The number of slums to be upgraded is very large and 
the present pace of slum upgradation is very slow.   It will, therefore, be difficult to meet 
the challenge in the given time frame unless the project is scaled up substantially.  
• SNP -a highly subsidized programme with major chunk of resources coming from the 
AMC:  Despite a cost sharing component built into SNP, very little contribution has been 
forthcoming from private sector, or the corporate sector. As a result, the AMC has to 
bear the major share of the costs involved in the programme. 
 
• Low participation of the NGOs resulting in slow progress of the SNP:  Over the past 6 
years only 16 slums have been upgraded and now another 47 slums have been lined up 
for upgradation in second phase as against the clearance given to 500 slum pockets for 
upgradation.  Only 2 NGOs are presently involved in this activity with the AMC, which 
is not enough to motivate large number of slum dwellers to join the project.  This 
essentially means that more and more NGOs are required to be roped in to participate in 
this project and take up the work of motivating the slum communities to join this project 
as partners. (Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2008) 
The AMC also cites additional issues with reliance on slum upgrading and the Slum Networking 
Project as the key approach to housing the urban poor: 
• Expansion/densification of existing slums posing a greater challenge:  The SNP is 
addressing the current infrastructure demand in slums keeping in view the number of 
dwelling units existing in each slum.  Simultaneously, expansion /densification of the 
slums is taking place at a rapid pace.  In such a scenario the infrastructure provided in the 
slums will become wholly inadequate, over stressed and may nullify improvements made 
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if the densification of serviced slums is not checked. 
• Lack of efforts to arrest proliferation of slums:  In absence of a policy and action to create 
affordable housing stock for the urban poor in the city, the growth of new slums will 
remain unabated. (Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2008) 
These last two parts are particularly interesting in the context of slum upgrading as a solution for 
housing the urban poor: that an upgrading strategy alone does not adequately address the issues 
in a rapidly urbanizing context such as Ahmedabad. Increased infrastructure provision in some 
informal communities makes them more desirable places to live and paired with persistent land 
constraints for the urban poor, may lead to increased densification in the slums, which would 
again overwhelm existing infrastructure. Furthermore, the lack of an adequate program that 
actually increases housing stock for the urban poor will encourage more slum communities, a 
lesson that was learned long ago with slum clearance policies. 
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Chapter Five 
Development Plan - Town Planning Scheme 
 The Development Plan – Town Planning Scheme (DP-TPS) mechanism in Gujarat has 
gained recent attention as a “friendlier” alternative to land acquisition and development for 
public purposes (Ahmed, 2007; Jain, 2008; Nair & Ahluwalia, 2010). Bringing together 
infrastructure development and financing, land use controls, plot regularization, and provision of 
land for social purposes under one piece of legislation and two linked plan preparation activities 
is seen by some as a fair, cost effective and non-disruptive method for managing urban growth 
(Patel, 2009). The DP-TPS is similar to well-documented land readjustment practices in other 
countries, which set formal and informal rules to facilitate property rights exchanges for urban 
development projects (Hong, 2010). Land readjustment, however, typically includes greater 
provisions for collective action and democratic among property owners and tenants, which will 
be discussed later in this section. 
While the DP-TPS process is not specifically targeted to the purpose of housing for the 
urban poor, by enabling the development of agricultural land and allocating serviced urban land 
for future EWS housing, it provides a key input into the housing development process. The 
struggles of Indian cities in finding adequate sites for housing for the poor under the JNNURM 
program illustrate how needed a mechanism like the DP-TPS process may be. If cities do not 
have to rely on contentious land acquisition methods to provide serviced land for housing9, it is 
possible that housing development processes may run more smoothly. 
                                                           
9 For example, in response to plans by the Vijayawada Municipal Corporation (VMC) to acquire 203.45 acres of 
agricultural land and use it for the construction of houses for low income populations under JNNURM, 100 farmers 
of Veduru Pavuluru village vehemently opposed the VMC proposal, further delaying the construction process 
(“Farmers oppose VMC's plans for land acquisition,” 2010). The VMC proposed to share the land with the farmers 
60:40, but the farmers maintained that their land was only appropriate for agriculture and not for housing. 
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Legislative grounding for the Town Planning Scheme mechanism 
While urban planning and appropriating developed land for the poor may be new tasks in 
some cities, those in the state of Gujarat have been empowered in these tasks for some time. 
Beginning with the Bombay Town Planning Act of 1915, local government (under state 
supervision) was empowered to deal with city-level construction and infrastructure matters 
(Wood, 1958), including “land pooling and redistribution,” under Section 12 of the Act. Home 
describes: 
Derived from the German Lex Adickes, [Section 12] stimulated a long discussion at the 
Town Planning Institute in London in 1920, because such provisions did not exist in 
Britain. With the consent of the landowners, a public authority could combine their 
interests, and give them one or more plots to be held under common ownership, in ‘the 
spirit of true cooperation.’ An owner could pool his irregular plot and receive a better 
one, and continue cultivating until ready to develop or sell. The Act thus sought to 
encourage onto the market large areas of development land which without co-operative 
action would have stayed as agricultural land.” (Home, 1997, p. 175) 
The Town Planning Act was re-enacted twice –once in 1954, after independence from Great 
Britain in 1947, and again in 1976, after the split of the state of Bombay into Maharashtra10 and 
Gujarat in 1960. The present legislation in Gujarat is The Gujarat Town Planning and Urban 
Development Act, 1976 (GTPUDA 1976) that was most recently amended in 1999.   
                                                           
 
The VMC resorted to this 60:40 land-sharing proposal with farmers after realizing the limits of land availability in 
the city, running into trouble when attempting to acquire land that already had residences established on it, and 
contemplating the best means to acquire remaining agricultural land (Subba Rao, 2009). The 60:40 scheme came 
about in the village of Jakkampudi where the VMC faced stiff opposition to proposed housing schemes on worked 
agricultural land. 
10 Maharashtra too retained a Town Planning Act (Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966), but its 
Town Planning Scheme function is less used (Patel, 2009). 
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Under GTPUDA 1976, each city in the state creates a ten-year Development Plan11 which 
“defines the direction of growth and envisions the citywide infrastructure for the entire 
development area” (Ballaney, 2008, p. 10). It further makes specific proposals with respect to 
components of development such as roads, water and sanitation infrastructure, land use zoning, 
open space, etc. While the plan is created at the municipal level, it is sent to the state government 
twice for approval and oversight (Ballaney, 2008, 2010).  
 
Overview of the Town Planning Scheme mechanism 
Each Development Plan includes area for city expansion – undeveloped land to be 
opened up. These areas are divided into smaller blocks of 100 to 200 hectares called Town 
Planning Schemes (TPSs). In preparing the Development Plan, the municipal authority (in 
Ahmedabad the Urban Development Authority (AUDA) or the Municipal Corporation (AMC) 
identifies the priority TPS areas that will be developed first. This identification is based on 
evidence of informal urban development or land price increases that indicate that the area should 
be converted from agricultural to urban land (Ballaney, 2010). The TPS areas are initially 
comprised of irregular plots, which are zoned for agriculture and typically owned by 100 to 250 
different landowners. After careful surveying of the TPS area and research into land ownership 
databases and records, a base map is drawn of the TPS with these Original Plots (OPs) 
designated. This step is identified by Ballaney (2008) as a bottleneck in the process due to the 
previously mentioned overlapping and incoherent land management databases and claims. It is 
also a point of risk for corruption as the power to resolve landownership disputes may rest in a 
single individual, a representative of the urban development authority or the State-appointed 
Town Planning Officer, depending on when the dispute is raised (Government of Gujarat, 1976). 
                                                           
11 This was optional in the 1915 Act, but became mandatory in the 1954 revision (Wood, 1958). 
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Following the preparation of the base map, a Draft TPS, indicating the proposed road 
layout and sections of land designated for public purposes (parks, schools, EWS housing) and for 
sale (up to fifteen percent of the total TPS area) is prepared. This plan also includes proposed 
locations of Final Plots (FP) 12 for each landowner. All together, the appropriated land typically 
amounts to around 40 percent of the TPS area, and every effort is made to have each land owner 
lose the same proportion of land13. Based on the original value of each piece of land14, and the 
proportion ceded to the municipality, a compensation figure for each land owner is determined. 
At the same time, the increased value of the final (reduced) plot of land, once it is serviced with 
infrastructure, is estimated. In principle, the land owner is charged fifty percent of this increment 
as a “betterment” charge. However, in practice, the betterment charge is equivalent to the 
estimated cost of infrastructure provision distributed across the landowners proportionally to the 
amount of land held by each (Ballaney, 2008, 2010). Any difference between the compensation 
value and the betterment charge is calculated and allocated to the appropriate party. All of these 
values are entered into an F Form—a spreadsheet in a format prescribed in the GTPUDA Rules 
(Government of Gujarat, 1979) to track the financial information in the TPS process. A cursory 
review of publicly available data indicates that in most cases, the landowner must pay the 
municipal authority some amount as the betterment charge exceeds the compensation amount 
(Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, n.d.). Figures 1-3 show a sample Draft TPS, detail view 
showing the original and final plots, and a sample F Form indicating the amount of land 
appropriated, compensation values and betterment charges for each landowner. 
                                                           
12 These plots are located as close to the original plot as possible. 
13 This is considered by proponents of the scheme to be an indicator of the equitable nature of the process. However, 
in some cases, this has been deviated from, such as for very small landholders who reside on their land (Ballaney, 
2010). This calls into question whether taking an equal portion from each landowner without consideration of their 
dependence on the land for livelihood purposes is actually equitable.  
14 Except in rare cases where changes in zoning, etc. alter the value of the land 
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Figure 1. Draft Town Planning Scheme No. 95 -- Geratpur showing proposed infrastructure, land appropriations and 
final plots (red outlines) over the original plots (green outlines). 
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Figure 2. Detail of Draft Town Planning Scheme No. 95 showing land appropriated for EWS housing (orange), sale, 
and garden use as well as original (green outline) and final (red outline) plots. 
 
   
 44 
 
Fi
gu
re
 3
. S
am
pl
e 
F-
Fo
rm
 fo
r D
ra
ft 
To
w
n 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 S
ch
em
e 
N
o.
 9
5 
sh
ow
in
g 
la
nd
 a
re
a,
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
an
d 
be
tte
rm
en
t c
ha
rg
e 
va
lu
es
. 
 
   
 45 
After the preparation of the Draft TPS, notice of the intention to prepare a TPS is 
published in local newspapers and landowners in the area covered by the TPS are invited by the 
entity producing the planning scheme15 to a public meeting to express their concerns or 
objections to the proposed scheme. This initial meeting and the subsequent redressal process 
deals with issues related the physical layout of the TPS. After the planning entity has reconciled 
physical layouts in the Draft plan with landowners, it is submitted to the State government and 
sanctioned as a Preliminary TPS. Then, a State-appointed Town Planning Officer (TPO) 
conducts a separate grievance and redressal process with individual landowners related to 
compensation and charges. When the TPO has finished the grievance and redressal process with 
respect to financial issues, the plan is sanctioned as a Final TPS16. For a more detailed 
explanation of the TPS mechanism, see (Ballaney & Patel, 2009; Ballaney, 2008, 2010). 
The nature of public participation by landowners and tenants in the TPS process is a key 
difference between the DP-TPS mechanism and other land readjustment processes. Hong (2007) 
notes that in most countries employing the practice, a supermajority vote of affected landowners 
is needed to approve a land readjustment scheme. In contrast, according to GTPUDA (1976), any 
affected person’s written concerns or objections to the plan will be considered, but the decision 
to alter the scheme is up to the urban development authority, with the State government holding 
the power to sanction the scheme. This is substantially different from the democratic process in 
land readjustment and opens the door to potential corruption, whereby the concerns of political 
                                                           
15 Initially this was the Urban Development Authority, but in recent years, with the existence of private urban 
planning firms, they are more likely to take on the role of TPS preparation. In Ahmedabad, the Urban Development 
Authority has delegated some of the TPS-related responsibilities to the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation as well. 
Private planning firms are also frequently contracted by AUDA or the AMC to administer the TPS process. (S. 
Ballaney, personal communication, April 30, 2010). 
16 Amendments to the GTPUDA 1976 in 1999 allowed infrastructure development and social service land 
allocations to begin as soon as the Preliminary TPS was sanctioned. This, combined with increasing privatization in 
the urban planning field, increased the popularity and speed of the Town Planning Scheme Mechanism (S. Ballaney, 
personal communication, April 30, 2010). 
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or economic elites are given more weight and consideration in the hearing process. News reports 
(Dave, 2010; Express News Service, 1999, 2009) indicate that there is some concern about the 
planning and redressal process with respect to equity, participation and corruption. 
 
Benefits of the Town Planning Scheme mechanism  
As mentioned earlier, one of the main benefits of the TPS mechanism is its relative 
fairness and ease of use as compared to traditional land acquisition processes that appropriate all 
of a person’s land for public purposes. For example, if the urban development authority intended 
to build a road in a certain site, only the land directly in the road’s path would be acquired, at a 
low level of compensation. The landowner of that parcel would lose out considerably, while the 
owner of a parcel directly adjacent to the road would benefit considerably from the improved 
infrastructure. Alternatively, the state would acquire all of the land adjacent to the road, at a 
considerable cost, and be the sole beneficiary while landowners feel that their property rights had 
been violated. As a land pooling and redistribution scheme, the TPS mechanism endeavors to 
distribute costs and benefits more equitably among landowners17. 
 
General critiques of the Town Planning Scheme mechanism 
Drawing on Ballaney (2008, 2010), who has worked for over 20 years on TP Schemes, and a 
comparison with common practices of land readjustment mechanisms, the following are some of 
the weaknesses of the TPS mechanism: 
                                                           
17 It is unclear, however, exactly what is the process when an individual landowner objects to or refuses to cede land 
to the local government. Patel’s (2009) claim that the TPS process has been tested and upheld by the justice system 
suggests that schemes do move forward, however, more research is necessary to determine if “holdouts” receive 
better compensation or more favorable land, reducing the equitable component of the process.  
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• Lengthy time frames: Ballaney states that the State Government typically takes much 
longer to completely approve a TPS than the four-year period allocated for the 
completion of the schemes. This may be unsurprising given that the State must review 
each TPS four times before completion. A look at the approval times for Preliminary and 
Final TPSs indicates that it is not at all unusual for approval to take well over a decade 
(Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, n.d.; AUDA, n.d.), making any valuation or cost 
estimates obsolete. In some cases, landowners have protested the delays, drawing the 
attention of the courts (Dabhi, 2010).  
• Individualized grievance and redressal process: The one-on-one nature of the grievance 
and redressal process gives power to “holdouts,” who can delay the approval process as 
well as leaves considerable scope for corruption and favoritism since processes may not 
be transparent. By comparison, typical land readjustment mechanisms rely more on group 
decisions and votes, providing a more open process and reducing risk of holdouts. 
• Centralized processes: The State Government and particularly the Town Planning Officer 
wield considerable control in the DP-TPS process. Landowners are given little choice as 
to whether or not to proceed with a TPS at initial stages. Furthermore, any inaction at the 
State level18 can lead to significant delays. Furthermore, the consolidation of power with 
the TPO again leaves the process open to corruption. Finally, the considerable State 
oversight is not in line with the spirit of the 74th Amendment, which is meant to allocate 
greater responsibility to the local bodies. 
There are also contextual factors that inhibit the effective use of the TPS mechanism: 
• Incoherent land databases: As mentioned earlier, the multitude of land databases slows 
down the initial mapping process and give space for corruption as the owner and parcel 
                                                           
18 Even if unintentional and due to overburdened public servants 
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boundaries identified by the TPS drafting process become the official record after a 
scheme is sanctioned. Land ownership disputes are handled by municipal or state-level 
employees who could use the process to gain rents.  
• Lack of asset management framework at the municipal level: In many local authorities, 
land assets are not adequately catalogued or managed. 
• Severe undervaluation of land: Because of high stamp duties and other land related taxes 
historically, official records of land prices are severely undervalued. Due to the current 
process of valuing final plots in TPSs by adding the cost of infrastructure to the officially 
recorded land price, the final plots too are undervalued. As a result, landowners gain 
significantly from the TPS process19, while the local government at times needs to draw 
from other sources to finance its infrastructure (since prices change while TPSs go 
through the approval process). While in the short term, this increases the likelihood that 
landowners would be willing participants in the TPS; it also presents a potential drain on 
municipal finances20.  
 
Town Planning Scheme mechanism as enabling the housing development process 
Nair and Ahluwalia (2010) report in Indian Express that in the past five years, around 
11,000 units of housing for the urban poor have been constructed on land appropriated through 
the TPS mechanism in Ahmedabad. While this number is not significant when compared to the 
estimated 884,000 living in slums in the city, when placed side by side with the roughly 8,400 
households served by the Slum Networking Project between 1996 and 2005 (Ahmedabad 
                                                           
19 Ballaney (2010) estimates that the difference in final plot valuation and actual market value may be as high as a 
factor of 10 or 20. 
20 Furthermore, if this difference in valuation is the main reason landowners are interested in the process, this would 
presented a major challenge in the future if valuation were brought closer to market prices. 
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Municipal Corporation, 2008), it is quite an accomplishment. One advantage of the TPS process 
is that it reconciles the many ownership claims on land parcels and records them21, then 
appropriates a certain portion (up to 10 percent by law) of the land for housing for EWS 
persons22. This way, land is available for future use when government or private bodies seek to 
develop affordable housing. Joshi and Sanga estimate that by 2006, TPSs had allocated around 
135 hectares of land for EWS housing. The process is systematic and provides a significant 
benefit to those who are giving up a portion of their land, so it is significantly less contentious 
than land acquisition for the express purpose of affordable housing. The land is also not paid for 
by the municipality as costs can be recovered through the betterment charges (Ballaney & Patel, 
2009). Furthermore, in contrast to cheap land on the far reaches of the urban periphery, land 
appropriated through the TPS process is already developed and may be adjacent to employment 
opportunities. 
At the same time, there are some issues with the use of the TPS mechanism to enable 
affordable housing development. While GTPUDA 1976 recommends around ten percent of the 
land in every TPS be appropriated for EWS housing, in practice, the amount is closer to 5-8%23. 
This is in part because in some cities, acquiring the full 50 percent of the land area enabled by 
the legislation is not politically feasible (Ballaney, 2010). Joshi and Sanga also point out that not 
all land reserved for EWS housing is necessarily buildable or well-located, though a staff 
                                                           
21 As Ballaney and Patel (2009) point out, this is by no means quick or easy, and improvements to the cadastral 
system in Indian cities would greatly expedite the process. 
22 While in other countries, the appropriation of private land for housing for the poor might be protested as a 
violation of property rights, it does not seem to be the case here. Allocation of some land for poor groups seems to 
have gained common currency, with the 2010 Gujarat Integrated Township Policy also setting aside land and 
housing for EWS groups (GUDC, 2010). 
23 Joshi and Sanga (2009) calculate that of the 986 hectares of land allocated for public purposes through TP 
Schemes by 2006, about 13.7 percent were designated for EWS housing. 
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member at an urban planning firm which prepares TP Schemes states that efforts are made to 
position those parcels close to relevant amenities like industry or social infrastructure24.  
 Some larger considerations are the use of lands before and after the TP Schemes are set in 
place. By design, the Town Planning Scheme mechanism deals only with formal ownership as 
per records residing with different agencies in the local government. As is well known, however, 
informal settlements may exist on these lands, and many residents of such settlements have in 
fact paid, albeit informally, to occupy the land on which they constructed their dwellings. Since 
the TPS process involves only the official owners, it does not address the residents of these 
settlements directly. Since the final plots does not line up directly with the original plot, the land 
on which the settlements exist could be under new ownership that did not support their existence. 
As a result, a TP Scheme could conceivably displace as many people as it enables housing for25.  
 It is also important to recognize that the TPS merely sets aside land for EWS housing; it 
is not tied to any additional legislation or powers to expedite the actual construction of said 
dwellings. Joshi and Sanga (2009), in a survey of appropriated TPS land, find that only six 
percent of lands allocated for SEWS housing under TPS schemes actually contained housing. 
Some land is occupied by informal settlements of poor groups, which are illegal under the 
GTPUDA, and thus vulnerable to clearance. A significant portion lay vacant (27.55 percent) or 
was still under agricultural use (20 percent), with the rest occupied by other commercial or 
residential development. The authors claim that even with JNNURM BSUP funding available, 
housing development showed little progress, though AMC documents reveal at least the 
                                                           
24 There is, however, some degree of NIMBYism, with some landowners not wanting EWS housing located adjacent 
to their parcels. However, a TPS prepared in Ahmedabad, Prahladnagar, was able to locate a significant amount of 
EWS housing in a very affluent urban area, suggesting that this practice does not always hold true.  
25 To do so brings up complicated property rights issues not discussed here. However, Ballaney and others are 
currently working on a theoretical system to manage property rights in these cases, which is still in early stages of 
development. 
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intention of using TPS appropriated land for this purpose26 (Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 
n.d.). This begs a larger question—if available land and financing are not adequate triggers for 
housing development for the urban poor, what is? 
 
                                                           
26 However, some of these TPS allocations are from Schemes approved decades ago, again raising the land 
management question stated by Ballaney earlier. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
 Making space in the city for the urban poor, whether by legitimizing informal land claims 
through government-sponsored upgrading schemes, or systematically reserving land for poor 
groups as town planning schemes are laid out, is necessary in contexts where a mismatch 
between incomes and housing prices make adequate land and shelter for all an impossibility 
under market mechanisms.   
 While upgrading programs at a small scale are lauded for their participatory nature, 
ability to adapt to the needs of the urban poor, and ability to build on the informal construction 
methods already being undertaken by poor groups, the Slum Networking Project, an attempt to 
institutionalize upgrading through municipal government, NGO and community partnerships, 
failed to reach scale in the city of Ahmedabad and appears to be receding as a city-level strategy. 
Scholars and practitioners who have examined the Ahmedabad Slum Networking Project found 
that the project design did not offer upgrading options that met the desires of slum dwellers, 
private sector partnership proved unsustainable for institutional and financial reasons, and 
reliance on limited NGO capacity for both community mobilization and implementation created 
bottlenecks in scaling up promising pilot efforts.  Furthermore, an upgrading approach without a 
complementary housing production program does not adequately address contexts of rapid 
urbanization and the densification and expansion of slum areas that accompany them.  
 A much heralded piece of legislation that seeks to offer a more equitable alternative to 
land acquisition is designed to limit unplanned urban growth through land pooling and 
reconstitution and offers an alternative path to making space for the urban poor. The 
Development Plan-Town Planning Scheme process in the state of Gujarat is enabled by the 
   
 53 
Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act of 1976, which explicitly requires a 
percentage of each newly reconstituted and serviced TPS area to be reserved for housing for 
Economically Weaker Sections of Indian society. Preliminary research suggests that this 
mandate has been successful in reserving some land for EWS housing, but the speed of the DP-
TPS process, the quality of reserved land, and the slow progress toward utilizing the reserved 
land are all causes for concern. While the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation has activated many 
of the reserved plots for housing under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission’s 
Basic Services to the Urban Poor (JNNURM BSUP) program, much of this land had been 
available for years, if not decades, with no housing built upon it. It is clear that land reservation 
alone does not provide adequate housing for the urban poor. However, under conditions where 
external factors, such as national government initiatives, foreign assistance projects, or economic 
crisis make affordable housing production a priority, serviced urban land remains a key input 
into the housing development process –and input that is scarce in many Indian cities.  
 An April 2010 report by the McKinsey Global Institute on “India’s urban awakening,” 
suggests that in order to bridge the gulf between urban populations and affordable housing stock, 
a plurality of approaches is necessary. Inasmuch as upgrading may empower poor groups, 
recognize their efforts in housing construction and their (informal) purchase of the land on which 
they live, there is strong justification for it as a general strategy. However, the lessons of the 
Slum Networking Project are many in terms of the complexity of multi-organizational 
partnerships, the tension between rigid service options that allow for ease of implementation and 
an array of choices that meet the needs and desires of slum residents. The capacity of non-
government organizations to conduct both community mobilization activities and implement 
upgrading projects is severely limited. Cities wishing to emulate the Ahmedabad SNP should 
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consider the strength and connectivity of its NGO partners or determine who else might join in 
the project. The evidence is stacked against industry as a philanthropic partner (even when it is 
relabeled ‘enlightened self-interest’), but the success of the Slum Electrification Programme 
suggests that utility companies that could see an expanded customer base through the upgrading 
process may be willing partners. Finally, while upgrading alone cannot keep pace with rapid 
urbanization in some contexts, particularly cities that are staying static in population, upgrading 
may provide the best option to guarantee adequate housing for all. In these locations, the market 
value of land may not be very high, due to low growth, so “enabling” approaches would not be 
appropriate. 
 As for the Town Planning Schemes, in areas with rapid urbanization, a scarcity of 
developed land, and thus high land values, the DP-TPS mechanism presents a clear opportunity 
to both bolster the urban land market by developing land and to simultaneously allocate space in 
newly developed areas for housing for the poor. However, there are considerations when 
applying this mechanism, the largest of which relate to the relationship between the urban local 
bodies and the state government and to the connection between the process and the reality of 
informal settlements in India. While the DP-TPS process appears to be a local government one, 
the large number of state-level reviews and approvals required by the current legislation delay 
progress and vest too much power in the Town Planning Officer as a single individual. As this 
same legislation does not exist in other Indian states, with the exception of Maharashtra, any city 
wishing to copy this model should seek to reduce the involvement of the state-level government 
in any proposed new legislation.  
 The question of how DP-TPS relates to the existence of informal settlements is perhaps 
best thought of in terms of its legislative history. The Bombay Town Planning Act of 1915 arose 
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during a period when clearance and reconstruction was still the accepted norm for urban slums. 
Public health concerns overrode those of property rights during that era. The failure of 
subsequent amendments to the Act to address the reality of informal claims to urban land is 
perhaps unsurprising, given ongoing debates about legalization of tenure for informal 
settlements. This “glossing over” of the topic of encroachments may allow the DP-TPS 
mechanism to proceed more quickly than if each TPS managed a rubric of not just 150 
landowners, but also another 500 users. That said, with the danger of a promising strategy for the 
appropriation of land for the poor adversely affecting this same population through displacement, 
the issue of property rights beyond ownership must be addressed. 
   
This thesis brings about a multitude of areas for further research. Among them are: 
- What additional mechanism or pressure is needed to encourage housing development on 
the land appropriated by the Town Planning Scheme Process? 
- What will a negotiation process with informal settlements on TPS land look like? 
- Without the near century of legislative history to build on, how can other Indian cities or 
states emulate the DP-TPS process? Is it politically tenable? 
- What have been the local land and housing market effects of the repeals of the Urban 
Land Ceiling and Regulation Act? Of the Rent Control Acts? 
 
 
   
 56 
Bibliography 
Acharya, B. P. (1987). The Indian urban land ceiling act: A critique of the 1976 legislation. 
Habitat International, 11(3), 39-51. doi:10.1016/0197-3975(87)90018-X 
Ahmed, S. K. (2007, June 12). Town planning scheme propelled State’s urban growth. 
Ahmedabad Newsline. Retrieved from 
http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=240739 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. (2008). Slum Networking Project (Pro active disclosure as 
per RTI Act 2008). Retrieved from http://www.egovamc.com/right_info/right_info.asp 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. (n.d.). DRAFT TOWN PLANNING SCHEME 
AHMEDABAD NO. 85, 59, 95, & 82: FORM-F REDISTRIBUTION AND 
VALUATION STATEMENT. 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. (n.d.). Status of Town Planning Scheme. 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. (n.d.). Housing Project (Pro active disclosure as per RTI Act 
2008). 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority, & CEPT 
University, Ahmedabad. (2006). City Development Plan Ahmedabad 2006-2012. 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission. 
AUDA. (n.d.). TP Scheme. Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority. Retrieved May 1, 2010, 
from http://www.auda.org.in/tp_scheme.html 
Ballaney, S. (2008). The Town Planning Mechanism in Gujarat, India. The World Bank 
Institute. 
Ballaney, S. (2010, April 30). The Town Planning Scheme Mechanism. Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. 
Ballaney, S., & Patel, B. (2009). Using the ‘Development Plan—Town Planning Scheme’ 
Mechanism to Appropriate Land and Build Urban Infrastructure. India Infrastructure 
Report, 190. 
Berner, E. (2002). Poverty Alleviation and the Eviction of the Poorest: Towards urban land 
reform in the Philippines. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24(3), 
536–553. 
Berner, E., & Phillips, B. (2005). Left to their own devices? Community self-help between 
alternative development and neo-liberalism. Community Development Journal, 40(1), 17. 
Chauhan, U., & Lal, N. (1999). Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Poor in Ahmedabad: A 
Slum Project. Economic and Political Weekly, 34(10/11), 636-642. 
Chen, S., & Ravallion, M. (2008). The developing world is poorer than we thought, but no less 
successful in the fight against poverty. Policy research working paper, 4703. 
Cohen, M. (2001). Urban assistance and the material world: learning by doing at the World 
Bank. Environment and Urbanization, 13(1), 37-60. doi:10.1177/095624780101300104 
Cohen, M., Madavo, C. E., & Dunkerley, H. (1983). Learning by doing: World Bank lending for 
urban development, 1972-82. World Bank. 
Dabhi, P. (2010, February 1). HC reprimands govt for delay in town planning scheme. Indian 
Express.com. Retrieved from http://www.indianexpress.com/news/hc-reprimands-govt-
for-delay-in-town-planning-scheme/573886/ 
Das, A. K., & Takahashi, L. M. (2009). Evolving Institutional Arrangements, Scaling Up, and 
Sustainability: Emerging Issues in Participatory Slum Upgrading in Ahmedabad, India. 
Journal of Planning Education and Research, 29(2), 213-232. 
   
 57 
doi:10.1177/0739456X09348613 
Dave, J. (2010, May 6). Bopal plan sends builders into tizzy. DNA: Daily News & Analysis. 
Ahmedabad. Retrieved from http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report_bopal-plan-sends-
builders-into-tizzy_1379681 
Davis, J. (2004). Scaling up urban upgrading: Where are the bottlenecks? International 
Development Planning Review, 26(3), 305-324. doi:10.3828/idpr.26.3.4 
De Soto, H. (2003). The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails 
everywhere else. Basic Civitas Books. 
Dutta, S. S. (2000). Partnerships in urban development: a review of Ahmedabad's experience. 
Environment and Urbanization, 12(1), 13-26. doi:10.1177/095624780001200102 
Express News Service. (1999, June 14). Scheme will benefit farmers -- AUDA chairman. Indian 
Express.com. 
Express News Service. (2009, September 15). Farmers take out rally to protest land acquisition 
for Town Planning Scheme. Indian Express.com. Retrieved from 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/farmers-take-out-rally-to-protest-land-acqui/517078/ 
Farmers oppose VMC's plans for land acquisition. (2010, March 19). The Hindu. Retrieved from 
http://www.thehindu.com/2010/03/19/stories/2010031960480300.htm 
Government of Dubai. (2006). Winners: 2006: Slum Networking Programme - Ahmedabad. 
Retrieved May 1, 2010, from 
http://www.dubaiaward.ae/Web/WinnersDetails.aspx?s=34&c=102 
Government of Gujarat. (1976). Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act. 
Government of Gujarat. (1979). Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Rules. 
Government of India. (2005). JNNURM Primer: Repeal of Urban Land Ceiling & Regulation 
Act (ULCRA). Retrieved from 
http://www.jnnurm.nic.in/nurmudweb/Reforms/Primer.htm# 
Government of India. (2010, March 15). Mumbai Press Information Bureau. Retrieved April 28, 
2010, from http://pibmumbai.gov.in/scripts/detail.asp?releaseId=E2010PR474 
GUDC. (2010). Gujarat State Integrated Township Policy. GUDC - Gujarat Urban Development 
Company Ltd.. Retrieved May 16, 2010, from 
http://www.gudcltd.com/townshippolicy.asp 
Gulyani, S., & Connors, G. (2002). URBAN UPGRADING IN AFRICA: A Summary OF 
RAPID ASSESSMENTS IN TEN COUNTRIES. 
Hardoy, J., & Satterthwaite, D. (1993). Housing policies: A review of changing government 
attitudes and responses to city housing in the third world. In Urban management: policies 
and innovations in developing countries. Westport: Praeger. 
Hesselberg, J. (2002). Issues in urbanisation: study of Ahmedabad City. Rawat Pubns. 
Home, R. K. (1997). Of planting and planning: the making of British colonial cities. Taylor & 
Francis. 
Hong, Y. (2007). Assembling Land for Urban Development. In Y. Hong & B. Needham (Eds.), 
Analyzing land readjustment: economics, law, and collective action. 
Hong, Y. (2010, May 3). Land Readjustment as a _Urban Redevelopment Tool. Presented at the 
Land Policy Challenges for Reconstruction of  Cities Damaged by the Earthquake and 
tsunami, Chile. 
Hyderabad Municipal Corporation. (2006). Hyderabad City Development Plan. 
Jain, A. (2008). Urban Land Policy and Management Reforms. ITPI Journal, 5(3), 60-68. 
Joshi, R., & Sanga, P. (2009). Land reservations for the urban poor: the case of town planning 
   
 58 
schemes in Ahmedabad (No. Working Paper 4). Centre for Urban Equity, CEPT 
University, Ahmedabad. 
Keivani, R., & Werna, E. (2001). Refocusing the housing debate in developing countries from a 
pluralist perspective. Habitat International, 25(2), 191-208. doi:10.1016/S0197-
3975(00)00024-2 
Kochi Municipal Corporation. (2006). Kochi City Development Plan. 
Kundu, A. (2001). Institutional innovations for urban infrastructural development: the Indian 
scenario. Development in Practice, 11(2), 174. doi:10.1080/09614520120056333 
Kundu, A., Bagchi, S., & Kundu, D. (1999). Regional Distribution of Infrastructure and Basic 
Amenities in Urban India: Issues concerning Empowerment of Local Bodies. Economic 
and Political Weekly, 34(28), 1893-1906. 
Mahadeva, M. (2006). Reforms in housing sector in India: impact on housing development and 
housing amenities. Habitat International, 30(3), 412–433. 
Mahadevia, D., & Bhatt, V. (2002). Economic Liberalisation and the Urban Land Market: 
Trends from Ahmedabad. Issues in urbanisation: study of Ahmedabad City, 128. 
Mahalingam, S. (1998, August 1). The false ceiling. Frontline, 15(16). Retrieved from 
http://www.thehindu.com/fline/fl1516/15160940.htm 
Maharashtra assures repeal of ULCA Bill. (2007, November 19). Business Standard. Retrieved 
from http://www.business-standard.com/india/storypage.php?autono=304722 
Mahila Housing SEWA Trust. (2009). Urban Activity. Retrieved April 26, 2010, from 
http://www.sewahousing.org/index.php?p=Urban&c=t&gallery=UrbanActivities 
Mayo, S., & Angel, S. (1993). Housing: Enabling markets to work. The World Bank. 
Washington, DC. 
McGill, R. (1998). Urban management in developing countries. Cities, 15(6), 463–471. 
Mehta, M., & Mehta, D. (1989). Priorities in Urban Planning and National Commission on 
Urbanisation. Economic and Political Weekly, 24(21), 1178–1184. 
Mitlin, D. (2007). Finance for low-income housing and community development. Environment 
and Urbanization, 19(2), 331. 
Mukhija, V. (2001). Upgrading Housing Settlements in Developing Countries: The Impact of 
Existing Physical Conditions. Cities, 18(4), 213-222. doi:10.1016/S0264-2751(01)00014-
2 
Nair, R., & Ahluwalia, I. J. (2010, February 24). Expanding our towns for urban growth. Indian 
Express.com. Retrieved from http://www.indianexpress.com/news/expanding-our-towns-
for-urban-growth/583596/ 
Nayudu, U. (2008, October 15). Mega city dream a nightmare for slum dwellers. Indian 
Express.com. Retrieved from http://www.indianexpress.com/news/mega-city-dream-a-
nightmare-for-slum-dwellers/373570/0 
Nayudu, U. (2009a, September 1). Civic body’s town planning scheme threatens its own slum 
networking project. Indian Express.com. Retrieved from 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/civicbodystownplanningschemethreatensitsownslum
networkingproject/509673/2 
Nayudu, U. (2009b, October 15). Piplag slum dwellers a harried lot as civic body fumbles for 
final solution. Indian Express.com. Retrieved from 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/piplag-slum-dwellers-a-harried-lot-as-civic-body-
fumbles-for-final-solution/529243/1 
Parikh, H. (2008). Slum Networking – Transcending Poverty with Innovative Water and 
   
 59 
Sanitation Paradigm | Changemakers. Tapping Local Innovation: Unclogging The Water 
And Sanitation Crisis. Retrieved May 1, 2010, from http://www.changemakers.com/en-
us/node/6722 
Patel, B. (2009). Making Urban Planning Work: Gujarat's Town Planning Scheme Mechanism. 
India Urban Space Foundation. Retrieved April 30, 2010, from 
http://indiausp.net/?q=node/151 
Patel, B., Ballaney, S., Koshy, C., & Nohn, M. (2009). Reforming Urban Land Management in 
Gujarat. India Infrastructure Report, 176-189. 
Rao, P. S. N. (2006). Transformation of Housing Policy in India: The Trend Towards Market 
Mechanisms. Urban governance and management: Indian initiatives, 189. 
SAATH. (2010). Infrastructure. SAATH - Creating Inclusive Cities. Retrieved May 1, 2010, from 
http://www.saath.org/saath/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=101&Item
id=98 
Samad, T. (2006). Institutional synergies in the delivery of urban upgrading services: lessons 
from the Slum Networking Program in Ahmedabad, India. Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. 
Satterthwaite, D. (2010). Upgrading Slums: With and For Slum-Dwellers. Economic and 
Political Weekly, 45(10), 10-13. 
Satyanand, P. N. (2007). Engaging with Citizens to Improve Services: Overview and Key 
Findings. Water and Sanitation Programme-South Asia. 
Sivam, A., & Karuppannan, S. (2002). Role of state and market in housing delivery for low-
income groups in India. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 17(1), 69–88. 
Smyser, C. (2004). Innovative Approaches to Slum Electrification. USAID. 
Subba Rao, G. (2009, June 21). Scarcity of land hits JNNURM housing project. The Hindu. 
Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/2009/06/21/stories/2009062158350300.htm 
Surat Municipal Corporation, Surat Urban Development Authority, & School of Planning, CEPT 
University, Ahmedabad. (2006). City Development Plan Surat 2006-2012. 
The World Factbook. (2009). Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html 
Turner, J. F. (1968). Housing patterns, settlement patterns, and urban development in 
modernizing countries. Journal of the American Planning Association, 34(6), 354–63. 
United Nations Human Settlements Programme. (2006). Enabling shelter strategies. UN-
HABITAT. 
Wood, J. (1958). Development of Urban and Regional Planning in India. Land Economics, 
34(4), 310–315. 
 
